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Abstract 
European fiscal rules failed to dampen shocks and are often criticized for being too complex, 
not transparent and poorly enforced. Using EU country-level data, we find evidence of fiscal 
policy procyclicality for the key current fiscal framework indicator, the change in structural 
balance. We show that an alternative measure, the cyclically adjusted government spending 
growth rate, is more effective in activating a countercyclical fiscal response. Moreover, by 
simulating the bindingness of the new expenditure rule, we verify that it would have triggered 
a different course of action by EU member states, changing the EU fiscal history. 
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The current European fiscal framework is highly criticized, mainly because of its lack of 
transparency and simplicity (Feld et al., 2018) and due to the “poor functioning of the current 
fiscal rules”, as addressed by Benassy-Quéré et al., 2018. Some authors (e.g. Darvas et al., 
2018) argued that the existing framework is partly responsible for the fiscal austerity which 
followed the economic crisis. 
Regardless multiple attempts of further fiscal coordination, the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) was not able neither to avoid the development of fiscal imbalances 
before the economic crisis (Andrle et al., 2015) nor to reduce the risks generated by the 2008 
financial meltdown. This result conflicts with the literature, which states that fiscal rules should 
be more effective in a monetary union, where states cannot neither set their interest rates nor 
devaluate national currencies in order to stabilise the countries’ debts (Barnes and Casey, 2019). 
The framework’s failure can be motivated by two prominent results. Firstly, the debt 
sustainability of EU countries was not guaranteed by an appropriate fiscal discipline able to 
actively reduce the Member States’ deficit biases (Claeys et. al, 2016). Secondly, the process 
of countercyclical fiscal policy was not activated, whereas procyclical measures exacerbated 
economic and social problems, negatively affecting public budgets, potential growth and 
unemployment (Darvas et al., 2018). As showed by Christofzik et al. (2018) and clearly 
explained by Darvas et al. (2018), the effects of procyclical fiscal rules can be observed in both 
periods: “in the expansion phase deficits and debt levels are not reduced as much as they should 
be despite fiscal multipliers are presumably lower and fiscal consolidation policies ought to be 
implemented, while in the recession phase fiscal consolidation plans cannot achieve their 
objectives, given the higher fiscal multipliers, and the public debt increases”. Another drawback 
is related to the compliance of the rules by the single countries and their enforcement by the 
European and national fiscal authorities, which has largely proved to be ineffective. 
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In order to reform the European fiscal architecture and obtain more countercyclical, less 
complex and more enforceable fiscal rules, many “discipline and stabilisation improving” 
proposals (Benassy-Quéré et al., 2018) were presented. In this paper, we start by focusing on 
one of them, which received a large support among economists (Benassy-Quéré et al., 2018; 
Darvas et al., 2018): a new operational expenditure rule, illustrated by Ducoudré et al. (2018). 
To check if the history of the past years could have been different with the proposal already in 
place, a backward looking test on the compliance levels of both current and new fiscal rules is 
performed. In a second section, we empirically verify if the existing rule (based on the structural 
balance growth rate) acts in a procyclical way, and therefore it is unable to cushion shocks. 
Moreover, we evaluate if the considered expenditure rule or the use of alternative government 
budgetary aggregates would have strengthened the long-term debt sustainability by activating, 
on the medium term, a countercyclical reaction of the fiscal stance to the economic cycle. 
The compliance results obtained from the simulation show that the new rule would have been 
enforced more than the existing one in the Euro Area. Using a comprehensive set of country-
level data covering all European Union Members from 1999 to 2019, a country and time fixed-
effect model of the fiscal impulse response to the change in the output gap is subsequently 
estimated. The fiscal impulse is calculated in different stages of the budgetary process and 
according to a set of different fiscal instruments, to confront their performances and determine 
which one is the most effective to counteract to the cycle. The results confirm a procyclical 
behaviour of the current rule and a countercyclical effect generated by the new expenditure rule, 
while the fiscal response activated by other government indicators is more ambiguous. 
The paper observes the following structure: section 2 provides an overview of the current fiscal 
framework and presents a literature review of its structural weaknesses, proposing a new 
instrument to correct them. Section 3 simulates how binding the new rule would have been in 
the eventuality of its application and checks the compliance of the current rule. Section 4 defines 
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the methodology adopted for testing the fiscal policy reaction to the economic cycle. 
Consecutively, in section 5, the country-level data sources are presented along with the 
descriptive statistics of the variables used. Results obtained from the empirical analysis are 
reported in section 6, and followed by the conclusion. 
2. The fiscal framework 
2.1  The existing set-up: from 1997 to today 
Since the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the 3 percent headline deficit and the 
60 percent debt-to-GDP ratio fiscal rules were designed to accomplish the objective of long-
term debt sustainability (Christofzik et. al, 2018). They represent the first pillars of the 
European Union fiscal framework and were included in the Stability Growth Pact (SGP), 
introduced in 1997 to detect and correct excessive deficits of the EU Members. If both rules are 
met, the compliant country is under the “preventive arm”, whose risk reduction purpose is to 
monitor that the Member State’s discretionary policy doesn’t affect negatively the other 
countries of the Union (European Court of Auditors, 2018).  If at least one of the rules is 
breached, the country enters the “corrective arm”, and an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) 
is activated (Claeys et al., 2016). 
Nevertheless, the procyclical action of this set of rules triggered the replacement of the headline 
deficit with the structural deficit in 2005 (Christofzik et al., 2018). The rationale of this switch 
was the elimination of the cyclical economic fluctuations from the headline deficit, ensuring 
legislators to identify those discretionary policies potentially conducive to fiscal stability. 
However, by removing the contemporaneous cyclical component, the structural deficit was no 
longer merely dependent on observable government revenues and expenditures. As a result, the 
measurement process of the cyclical adjustment factor became of crucial importance for 
obtaining unbiased budgetary balances estimations. 
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The financial crisis and its aftermath implied a call for “reinforcing economic policy 
coordination” (European Commission Communication, 2010), which brought to the launch of 
the “six-pack” reform, later integrated by the “two-pack”, “aimed at strengthening budgetary 
surveillance” (European Fiscal Board, 2019). Three major changes to the framework resulted 
from it, designed to reduce procyclicality but at the expense of simplicity and transparency. 
The first was the provision of a more precise debt reduction requirement, consisting in the 
decrease by at least 1/20th of the gap between the actual debt and the 60 percent debt-to-GDP 
ratio for Members whose debt is higher than the target. However, this prescription was not 
efficient for the attainment of the expected adjustment path, especially because flexibility was 
used in order to avoid opening an Excessive Deficit Procedure (Darvas et al., 2018). 
The second concerns the creation of country-specific medium-term objectives (MTOs), 
conceived as fiscal devices to target the adjustment of the Members’ structural budgetary 
positions needed in order to ensure their debt sustainability. Albeit the fiscal indicator is 
determined considering the debt levels of each Member State (structural deficit at or above 0.5 
percent of GDP for countries with a debt-to-GDP ratio above 60 percent or at least 1 percent 
for those whose ratio is below the debt target), its fiscal risks and its economic actual status and 
development (European Commission Glossary), most of peripheral European countries 
experienced only a mild debt reduction, while some of them increased their debt-to-GDP ratios. 
Finally, the third was the introduction of the expenditure benchmark, which is the maximum 
medium-term growth rate allowed of real public expenditure (deflated by the GDP deflator 
forecast), not taking into account discretionary revenue measures and consistent with the 
fulfilment of the other fiscal targets, in case a Member State’s MTO is not attained (Council of 
the European Union, 2017). The rule added another element of complexity in the fiscal scheme 
and was designed to perform in a controlled scenario. It didn’t consider the possible impact of 
a persistent demand shock such as the one experienced after the 2008 economic crisis, that may 
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induce pessimistic estimates of potential output (hysteresis effect), as outlined by Coibion et al. 
(2017). 
2.2  The need for reform 
Currently, as noted by Wieser (2018), the framework’s lacking transparency and simplicity are 
caused by an heterogeneous system of coexisting national and supranational rules which are 
not implemented to the same degree, and worsened by the numerous exceptions and escape 
clauses that further limit the correct enforcement and compliance of the fiscal norms. 
Furthermore, the estimation of the structural budget balance, that is the budget balance adjusted 
for the economic cycle component and excluding one-off fiscal measures, introduced by the 
Fiscal Compact in 2013 and whose change is considered as the reference fiscal indicator, is not 
observable and subject to large measurement errors. Usually the revision calculated on an 
annual base in the change of the structural balance is larger than 0.5 percent of potential GDP, 
meaning it is larger than the baseline yearly adjustment requirement for countries that violate 
EU fiscal rules, and much larger in period characterized by economic uncertainty. One of the 
main reasons of the structural budget balance real-time forecasts unpredictability is their 
dependency on output gap, known as the difference between actual output and potential output, 
whose estimates are highly questionable. Consequently, this instrument should be addressed as 
not reliable for policymaking support (Claeys et al., 2016) and must be replaced by a new pillar, 
that conversely embodies a set of traits apt to optimally implement the fiscal targeted objectives. 
In this regard, the new fiscal rule should consider fiscal variables that could be directly 
controlled by governments, whose estimates are less sensitive to ex-post revisions and more 
reliable as forecast errors are smaller and not widening when considering cyclically adjusted 
measures. Moreover, another fundamental feature of the instrument should be its ability to 
ensure the correct functioning of automatic stabilizers, in order to obtain an anti-cyclical fiscal 
policy which compensates the state of the business cycle (Christofzik et al., 2018).  
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A more suitable fiscal rule that could be adopted as the new cornerstone and not alter the entire 
structure of the current framework is, as suggested by large strand of the economic literature 
(e.g. Fabrizio and Mody, 2008 and Darvas and Kostyleva, 2011), a reformed version of the 
expenditure benchmark. All expenditure aggregates can be curbed by governments, and by 
deducting the cyclical adjustment components it is possible to isolate the residual which is not 
responsive to the cycle. An expenditure rule would therefore guarantee relatively smaller real-
time forecast errors collected in an adjustment account and dispose of alpha and beta 
corrections, which are currently considered for the structural budget balance in consideration 
of potential output growth revisions and revenue windfalls (Christofzik et al., 2018). Indeed, as 
confirmed by Claeys et al. (2016), the revisions of the change in the structural balance estimates 
are much bigger than the ones of the medium-term average potential growth projections, used 
for the expenditure rule. Hence, endorsing what already argued by Anderson and Minarik 
(2006), more transparency and less susceptibility to manipulation is ought to be achieved. 
Lastly, automatic stabilisers are not restricted in the case of the expenditure rule, allowing to 
contain procyclical bias and to stabilise the fiscal accounts during downturns (Holm-Hadulla et 
al., 2012), while preventing the increase in debt and inflation during upswings. 
2.3 The new expenditure rule 
The proposal of a revised expenditure benchmark is based on the previous contributions of led 
Brück and Zwiener (2006), who pointed to the necessity of an expenditure rule supported by a 
medium term debt target as opposed to the current fiscal rule supervision made on an yearly 
basis, and of Andrle et al. (2015). Similarly, Ducoudré et al. (2018) suggested a rule which puts 
a ceiling to the growth rate of the cyclically adjusted expenditure aggregate, measured as the 
nominal public expenditure excluding interest payments, unemployment spending and one-off 
expenditure measures. As suggested by the authors, the fiscal variable should not grow faster 
than the nominal GDP (obtained as the sum of the potential real GDP and expected inflation), 
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ensuring a long term debt stabilization process and activating a short run potential 
countercyclicality of the fiscal policy. Moreover, public spending should increase with a slower 
pace for countries whose debt-to-GDP ratio is higher than 60 percent, those which should 
restructure their debts.  




















− 𝛾(𝑑𝑡−1 − 0,6) 
 
(1) 
where Gi,t represents the cyclically adjusted public expenditure, Ȳt  indicates the potential GDP, 
?̇?𝑡 the expected inflation and Dt the gross public debt, while dt is the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
The public expenditure adjustment parameter 𝛾 changes on the basis of the distance of the 
Member’s actual debt level from the public debt target, and it affects the speed of adjustment: 
the bigger the distance, the faster the speed. Incorporated as a country-specific debt correction 
mechanism, it would substitute the current 1/20th debt reduction rule. It is designed 
accordingly, for countries with high, medium and low debt-to-GDP ratios: 
 𝛾 = 0,02 if 
𝐷𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
> 0,9; 𝛾 = 0,01 if 0,6 <
𝐷𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
< 0,9; 𝛾 = 0 if 
𝐷𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
< 0,6 (2) 
The government control on the adjusted expenditure aggregate would be less difficult. 
Differently from the structural balance, the variable is not dependent on revenues, verified to 
be more positively correlated with the business cycle than expenditures by Christofzik et al. 
(2018), nor on unemployment and interest expenditures, with the latter particularly sensible to 
shifts in market sentiment (Claeys et al., 2016).  
3. The test on fiscal rule bindingness and current fiscal compliance 
In the following section, taking as reference the proposal of Ducoudré et al. (2018) , a 
simulation of how binding the new expenditure rule would have been, if effectively enforced, 
is performed for EU Members over the period between 2002 and 2019. The aim is to check 
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whether and to what extent the new instrument would have forced governments to redefine their 
fiscal policy platforms, thereby allowing a change in the countries’ procyclical fiscal stance 
behaviour and modifying the course of fiscal history in Europe. Besides, a test on the current 
MTO rule compliance is executed, in order to detect its actual level of enforcement.  
3.1  Comparison between the new expenditure rule and the MTO rule 
When analysing the difference between the actual cyclically adjusted nominal public 
expenditures and the ones recalculated by implementing the new expenditure rule, the empirical 
results show that the European Union would have breached the rule in 13 out of the past 18 
years, meaning the fiscal rule would have been binding over 72 percent of the overall period. 
Consequently, if this indicator was adopted and its limits were met, EU Members’ fiscal stances 
would have been more prudent, changing the course of EU. When considering the Euro Area, 
the percentage decreases to 61, corresponding to 11 out of the past 18 years. Overall, as showed 
by Figure 1, apart from the cases of Belgium, France and Italy, which report a higher number 
of non-compliant years (15 for Belgium and France, 14 for Italy), the remaining countries are 
below or correspond, as in the case of Lithuania, to the EU value. 
Figure 1: Number of years deviating from new expenditure rule targets, 2002 to 2019 
  
Source: Author’s own calculations based on AMECO dataset 
Notes: Accounted deviations occur when actual cyclically adjusted total expenditures are higher than their respective 
spending limits, determined following equations (1) and (2).    
From an annual basis perspective, Figure 2 results suggest that after a period of government 






























































































































































2008 financial crisis would have triggered a more spread adherence to the budgetary resources 
limits, followed by a further growth of the rule breaking Members in the last five years. 
Figure 2: Number of countries deviating from new expenditure rule targets, 2002 to 2019 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on AMECO dataset 
Notes: Accounted deviations occur when actual cyclically adjusted total expenditures are higher than their respective 
spending limits, determined following equations (1) and (2). 
When the MTO compliance is taken into account, as showed by Table 1 considering the Euro 
Area (with the exemption of Greece) over the period from 2011 to 2018, it results that the 
current fiscal rule was respected only in 32 percent of the cases (46 out of 144). However, once 
the country-specific objectives were achieved, governments tried to accomplish their targets 
even in the following years (Kamps and Leiner-Killinger, 2019).  
Table 1: Distance to country-specific MTOs, 2011 to 2018 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Belgium -4.5 -4.0 -3.8 -3.7 -3.0 -2.1 -1.3 -1.4 
Germany -0.6 0.4 0.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.7 
Estonia 0.1 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8 
Ireland -7.6 -6.0 -3.9 -3.6 -1.5 -0.3 0.4 -0.1 
Spain -6.3 -3.1 -1.7 -1.5 -2.4 -3.3 -3.0 -3.3 
France -5.0 -4.3 -3.4 -3.0 -2.3 -2.2 -1.7 -1.7 
Italy -3.3 -1.3 -0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -1.4 -1.7 -1.7 
Cyprus -4.9 -3.9 -0.7 3.3 1.7 1.2 1.4 0.8 
Latvia -1.1 0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 0.7 -0.2 -0.9 
Lithuania -3.8 -2.8 -0.9 -0.4 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.3 
Luxembourg 1.1 2.1 2.3 1.4 1.1 2.3 2.3 1.3 
Malta -1.9 -2.7 -1.7 -2.6 -2.5 0.5 3.5 0.6 
Netherlands -2.9 -1.5 -0.2 0.1 -0.4 1.3 1.0 0.4 
Austria -2.6 -1.9 -1.3 -0.3 0.4 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 
Portugal -6.2 -3.1 -2.6 -1.3 -1.8 -2.2 -1.4 -1.4 
Slovenia -4.5 -1.6 -1.2 -2.1 -1.3 -1.1 -0.9 -1.4 
Slovakia -4.2 -3.6 -1.1 -1.6 -1.7 -1.5 -0.5 -0.7 
Finland -1.3 -1.6 -0.6 -1.0 -0.4 -0.2 0.4 -0.3 
Source: Kamps et al.(2019) calculations based on AMECO database (spring 2018 vintage) 
Notes: Numbers refer to the distance of the structural balance from the country-specific MTO. Green and red cells 
refer to countries which respectively have or have not achieved their MTO. As explained in the European Commission 
Vade Mecum (2017), countries that have up to 0.2 percentage of points of distance to their MTO are also appraised 













4.1  Baseline model 
The empirical strategy used in order to assess the reaction of fiscal policy to the economic cycle 
is based on Eyraud et. al (2017), which tests respectively the contribution of discretionary policy 
planning and implementation to fiscal procyclicality, by using the following regression 
specification, on the panel data sample of  28 EU countries from 1999 to 2019: 
 ∆𝑠𝑏𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1∆𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
where i and t denote countries and years, ∆𝑠𝑏 indicates the fiscal impulse, defined as the change 
in the structural balance as a percentage of potential GDP, and 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1 represents the initial 
debt-to-GDP ratio. By controlling for the original debt level, the purpose is to seize an eventual 
policy response intended to ensure debt sustainability. Moreover, time and country fixed effects 
are included. Among the coefficients, 𝛽1 is the most relevant since it defines if the fiscal policy 
is acyclical, procyclical or countercyclical. An acyclical discretionary fiscal policy is targeted 
by a statistically insignificant coefficient, while in case of statistical significance a negative 
coefficient involves a procyclical policy and a positive coefficient a countercyclical policy. 
Robust standard errors are obtained and clustered by country. 
The regression model is run according to four settings. The first one is based on the fiscal 
impulse plans and the predicted variation in output gap, both reported by the Member countries 
governments at time t-1 and relative to time t. The second one relies on the fiscal impulse and 
variation in output gap Commission forecasts, following the same approach of the first setting: 
the estimated results are intended to be compared to the ones obtained using the first setting 
variables set in order to check whether the government plans were more optimistic, resulting in 
a higher policy procyclicality. The third one considers real-time fiscal impulse and variation in 
output gap, using outturns published in time t+1 and relative to time t.  The fourth one contains 
historical ex post fiscal impulse and variation in output gap.  
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To test whether fiscal policy reacts to the cycle differently when considering government 
balances as dependent variables, one additional fixed effects regression specification is 
employed, following the same four settings approach of specification (3): 
 ∆𝑔𝑔𝑏𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1∆𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
where ∆𝑔𝑔𝑏 indicates the fiscal impulse, defined now as the change of general government 
balances (total general government balance, adjusted general government balance and primary 
balance). 
The aim is to verify if, as suggested by the countercyclical results of Egert (2014) when 
considering the OECD countries sample, these fiscal indicators, which are more controllable 
by the national authorities, are able to guarantee the right functioning of automatic stabilizers 
and therefore react in a countercyclical way to the economic cycle. 
Finally, the fiscal impulse response to the cycle is tested when the growth rate of the cyclically 
adjusted expenditure aggregate, the one proposed by the new expenditure rule, is taken into 
account as dependent variable. The analysis, even in this case, adheres to the same regression 
specifications used for the other fiscal instruments, but the economic interpretation of the 
elasticity coefficient is different: if 𝛽1 in negative, in fact, this means that public spending is 
decreasing during upturns, implying a countercyclical fiscal policy response to the cycle. 
4.2  Model extension accounting for the position along the cycle 
To verify if fiscal policy procyclicality was observed along the cycle, an extension of the first 
specification is also presented: 
∆𝑠𝑏𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1∆𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡𝐷(∆𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 > 0) + 𝛽2∆𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡𝐷(∆𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 < 0) + 𝛽3𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
where two dummy variables for upturns and downturns are interacted with the variation in 
output gap: the interaction factors aim to analyse if the reaction of the policy to the economic 
cycle is asymmetrical. As coefficient 𝛽1 in specifications (3) and (4), coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 of 
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specification (5) define the acyclicality, procyclicality or countercyclicality of the fiscal policy. 
Consequently, if 𝛽1 is negative this means that during upswings, when the actual GDP growth 
is higher than the potential GDP growth, a fiscal expansion is implied by an increase in the 
output gap, generating a procyclical discretionary policy. Correspondingly, if 𝛽2 is negative 
this involves that during downturns, when the actual GDP growth is lower than the potential 
GDP growth, a fiscal tightening is determined by a decrease in the output gap, always resulting 
in procyclicality. As reported by Balassone and Francese (2004), in the case of procyclical 
upturns and procyclical or acyclical downturns the policy response to the cycle produce a 
“deficit bias” as well as a disproportionate accumulation of debt.  
Furthermore, following the approach of specification (5), a test of the asymmetrical response 
to the cycle of the fiscal policy measured by the government balances growth rates is performed: 
∆𝑔𝑔𝑏𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1∆𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡𝐷(∆𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 > 0) + 𝛽2∆𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡𝐷(∆𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 < 0) + 𝛽3𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (6) 
As in the baseline model, the meaning of the coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 is inverted if the 
discretionary policy reaction along the cycle is tested for the change in cyclically adjusted 
expenditures. 
4.3  Robustness check 
Differently from Eyraud et. al (2017), whose analysis sample is the Euro Area over the period 
1999-2015, national political economy variables like presidential election years and political 
fractionalization are not used as controls since they have already proved not to alter the results. 
Therefore, international factors might play a more decisive role in explaining the procyclicality 
effects and could thereby be investigated further. 
As a robustness check, in order to test whether the 2008 financial crisis could have been the 
trigger of the procyclicality bias, the period of fiscal consolidation between 2011 and 2013, 
which followed the stimulus of the years 2009 and 2010, is excluded. Other control variables 
whose significance and impact is tested are population growth, debt servicing, corresponding 
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to the interest payments-to-GDP ratio, trade openness, equivalent to imports and exports as a 
percentage of GDP, the size of the public sector, measured as the ratio of government 
consumption to GDP, the public investment-to-GDP ratio, as well as inflation and real GDP 
growth rates, to check whether an eventual inflation or demand shock can affect the reaction of 
the fiscal impulse to the cycle (Ducoudré et al., 2018). Lastly, real house price growth, measured 
by Eurostat house price index growth rate, is added as control in order to check whether and to 
which degree asset price cycles could affect fiscal impulse. 
5. Data and variables 
We use country-level data for all the Member States over the period between 1999 and 2019 
from three different sources. The first one is the AMECO macroeconomic database, provided 
by the European Commission, containing both historical data as of 2020 valid for the ex-post 
regression model setting, and the AMECO archive, which stores previous AMECO vintages of 
data, from 2011 to 2019, and are employed for the real-time data regression setting. The second 
sources are the Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs), documents issued on an yearly 
basis by the single EU Members containing projections of the principal macroeconomic 
indicators aimed at measuring the country-specific fiscal path towards their Medium Term 
Objectives (European Court of Auditors, 2018). The third are the Commission services’ 
assessment reports, which compare the latest government estimates with the Commission's 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) forecasts, published in the 
Commission Staff Working Documents (SDWs).  
Following the Ducoudré et al. (2018) approach, overall rather than primary structural balances 
are employed in the analysis due to data availability. Regarding the ex-post regression setting, 
in the period between 1999 and 2009, when data of structural balances is absent in the AMECO 
database, the variable is substituted by the cyclically adjusted balance, which differently from 
the structural balance includes in its estimation one-off and temporary measures. Similarly, for 
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the real-time regression setting, over the period from 1999 to 2006 cyclically adjusted balance 
is considered in substitution of the structural balance since not reported in the SCPs and SWDs. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for European Union country-level data, 1999 to 2019 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Government plans (t|t-1) 
 
          
Structural balance growth 433 0.446 0.4 0.658 -1.3 5.3 
General government balance growth 465 0.444 0.4 0.924 -8.3 5.3 
General government balance net one-offs growth 329 0.526 0.5 0.972 -9.6 3.7 
Primary balance growth 451 0.436 0.4 0.960 -8.2 5.5 
Output gap growth 433 0.205 0.2 0.82 -4.0 3.0 
Commission forecasts (t|t-1) 
 
          
Structural balance growth 382 0.074 0.1 0.611 -2.6 5.4 
General government balance growth 402 0.133 0.2 0.793 -8.6 3.2 
General government balance net one-offs growth 339 0.226 0.2 0.662 -5.2 2.8 
Primary balance growth 387 0.124 0.1 0.958 -8.5 3.5 
Output gap growth 397 0.266 0.3 0.933 -4.3 4.4 
Actual, real-time (t|t+1) 
 
          
Structural balance growth 469 0.021 0.1 1.787 -9.7 10.4 
General government balance growth 497 0.085 0.268 2.706 -19.923 19.395 
General government balance net one-offs growth 402 0.114 0.397 1.91 -10.0 4.3 
Primary balance growth 485 -0.001 0.1 2.709 -18.956 19.485 
Output gap growth 473 0.059 0.337 2.624 -20.1 11.1 
Actual, ex-post (t|2020) 
 
          
Structural balance growth 558 0.061 0.098 1.51 -5.392 7.147 
General government balance growth 558 0.09 0.207 2.362 -18.235 19.218 
General government balance net one-offs growth 252 0.598 0.481 1.003 -1.789 5.379 
Primary balance growth 558 -0.003 0.073 2.368 -17.413 19.764 
Cyclically adjusted expenditure growth 558 0.063 0.142 2.125 -18.462 18.656 
Output gap growth 558 0.08 0.448 2.346 -16.36 6.466 
 
 
          
Initial debt-to-GDP 559 57.445 52.024 33.378 3.766 181.21 
Population growth 560 0.240 0.257 0.84 -2.571 3.554 
Debt servicing 559 2.248 2.029 1.333 0.027 7.535 
Openness 560 116.874 100.85 64.836 45.4 408.4 
Inflation growth 560 2.48 1.957 3.814 -15.784 25.311 
Real GDP growth 556 2.236 2.1 3.54 -14.3 24.0 
Public sector size 559 19.723 19.326 2.82 12.007 27.935 
Public investment-to-GDP 523 3.707 3.69 1.1 1.45 7.73 
Real house price growth 495 2.595 2.5 8.567 -36.3 45.5 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on AMECO database (for t|2020 variables), AMECO old vintages (for t|t+1 
variables from 2010 to 2019), Stability and Convergence Programs and Commission Staff Working Documents (for 
t|t+1 variables from 1999 to 2009 and t|t-1 variables from 1999 to 2019), Eurostat (for Openness, Real GDP growth 
and Public investment) 
Notes: Commission forecasts’ variables are available only from 2004 to 2019. Changes in General government 
balances net one-offs are available only from 2005 to 2019 for the t|t-1 and t|t+1 settings, and from 2011 to 2019 for 
the t|2020 setting. Real house price growth is available only from 2001 to 2019. 
In consideration of government balances, total general government balance is measured as the 
simple difference between total government revenues and expenditures, whereas the adjusted 
government balance aggregate is obtained by deducing by the former one-off measures. 
Primary balance corresponds instead to the government balance excluding interest payments 
on general government liabilities. 
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With respect to the expenditure rule specification, differently from the specifications using 
changes in structural balance and government balances, the data of the cyclically adjusted 
expenditure aggregate adopted in the relative regression model is only relative to the ex-post 
setting, because of the uneven calculation of the fiscal variable in the SCPs and SWDs. Indeed, 
the lack of homogeneity in the measurement approach  wouldn’t allow a proper comparability 
of the real-time and the planned estimations with the ex-post ones. 
Concerning the calculation of expected inflation, the expected growth of GDP prices is 
preferred to the expected growth of consumer prices since, as noticed by Ducoudré et al. (2018), 
since the former is less volatile than the latter and the sustainability of government expenditures 
is normally computed by using the nominal potential output trajectory. Potential GDP growth 
rate real-time measure is preferred to ex post evaluation, in order to decrease the impact of 
forecast errors. Lastly, the change in house price index (HPI) as calculated by Eurostat is 
employed to obtain a more uniform measurement of the real house price growth. 
6. Empirical results 
6.1  Fiscal policy procyclicality in EU: a visual representation 
As the first stage of the empirical analysis, variations in output gaps are plotted with changes 
in cyclically budget balances for the EU sample in the period 1999 to 2019. 
Fiscal policy countercyclicality would entail a concentration of the observations in the lower 
left or upper right quadrants, where the signs of the changes are the same, as opposed to fiscal 
policy procyclicality, which involves an aggregation of observations in the lower right and 
upper left quadrants. Fiscal policy acyclicality implies a neither positive nor negative 
correlation between variables. 
In the examined sample, as showed by Figure 3, changes in cyclically adjusted balances are 
negatively associated with changes in output gaps in more than 50 percent of the observations, 
suggesting a slightly procyclical reaction of the fiscal impulse to the economic cycle. In these 
18 
 
cases, either discretionary policy was weakened when actual output growth was lower than 
potential output growth, as in the upper left quadrant, or slackened when actual output growth 
was higher than its potential, as in the lower right quadrant. The scatterplot does not show a 
substantial negative correlation since the values of the considered variables may contain 
measurement errors. 
Figure 3: Correlation between changes in cyclically adjusted balances and output gaps 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on AMECO database 
 Note: Outlier observations (below -5 and above 5 percent) are omitted to improve the graph visual representation. 
Moreover, it is impossible to distinguish between the fiscal policy procyclicality occurred when 
the budget was planned and the one occurred when it was implemented. Therefore, the graph 
is not able to explain whether the discretionary policy procyclicality was already clear in the 
planning stage or if instead it materialized only in the implementation phase. The latter 
circumstance would manifest, for example, in the case of a countercyclical spending plan 
implied by an overoptimistic revenue forecast which could switch to procyclical after the 
outturn is obtained, because of disappointing revenue outcomes and cyclical condition (Eyraud 
et al., 2017). 
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6.2  Fiscal policy reaction measured by the change in structural balance 
The results of equation (3) presented in Table 3 show that the fiscal impulse is strongly 
procyclical for the European Union Members in all the analysed settings. Coefficient estimates 
for the elasticity of structural balance to output gap varies between -0.25 and -0.36, implying 
that an increase in the change of output gap by 1 percent is correlated with an up to 0.36 
percentage points expansion of the structural deficit growth rate.  This is to be expected given 
the robust dependency between the two variables and their parallel fluctuations before and after 
the economic crisis, confirming the findings of Eyraud et al. (2017) tested on the Euro Area 
sample and the estimations of Christofzik et al. (2018).  
Table 3: Fiscal policy procyclicality in the current framework  
          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





  Δ(SB/GDP) t|t-1   Δ(SB/GDP) t|t-1 Δ(SB/GDP) t|t+1 Δ(SB/GDP) t|2020 
Initial debt/GDP  0.0158*** 0.00633 0.0277*** 0.0253*** 
 (4.02) (1.61) (5.45) (6.00)    
Δ Output gap  -0.319*** -0.248*** -0.308** -0.364*** 
 (-3.76) (-4.25) (-3.45) (-5.86) 
Constant -0.794** -0.471 -2.091*** -1.876*** 
  (-3.28) (-1.85) (-5.80) (-6.03) 
Observations  433 381 464 558 
R2 0.270 0.156 0.270 0.302 
Country FixedEffects yes yes yes yes 
Time FixedEffects  yes yes yes yes 
t statistics in parentheses    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
   
Source: AMECO database (for t|2020 variables), AMECO old vintages (for t|t+1 variables from 2010 to 2019), Stability 
and Convergence Programs and Commission Staff Working Documents (for t|t+1 variables from 1999 to 2009 and 
 t|t-1 variables from 1999 to 2019)  
Note: Estimations rely on the panel ordinary least squared estimator. SB = structural balance. 
Surprisingly, the magnitude of the procyclical bias determined from the European Commission 
forecasts is smaller than the one obtained by governments’ budgetary plans, suggesting that the 
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Commission predicted on average relatively higher structural surpluses during upturns and 
lower structural deficits during downturns when compared to the legislators’ projections.  
Comparing the two fiscal policy responses based on the ex-ante estimates to the reaction 
observed with outturns, the national predictions seem to be more reliable, since the size of the 
procyclical bias is closer to the one detected using real-time data. However, this sensible 
difference might possibly be caused by the lower number of Commission forecasts 
observations. The actual ex-post fiscal impulse shows an even stronger procyclical behaviour 
of the fiscal rule, supporting the thesis that discretionary policy procyclicality was already 
indisputable during the planning stage, but not as distinct as after the implementation stage. 
Relatively to the factor capturing debt sustainability intended policy response, there is only a 
marginal evidence of countercyclicality, but it is too small to be considered relevant.  
The results are not significantly affected after performing a robustness check that include all 
the listed control variables, as showed in Table A1 (see Appendix), apart from the Commission 
forecast column, which shows a less procyclical response. 
Moreover, as shown by Table A2 (see Appendix), estimates corroborate the findings of Eyraud 
et al. (2018) regarding the absence of a causal effect between the post crisis fiscal strengthening 
and the procyclicality observed over the analysed time interval. Dropping observations from 
2011 to 2013, procyclicality becomes stronger, especially in the national plans column, 
indicating an even weaker fiscal policy reaction to the cycle during the remaining years, 
probably generated by overoptimistic government projections. 
Concerning the test of the asymmetrical discretionary policy response, equation (5) estimates 
illustrated in Table 4 point to a procyclical bias persistence along the period. Slack policies 
during upswings have inhibited Members to rebuild fiscal buffers when their economic actual 





Table 4: Asymmetric policy response and deficit bias in the current framework 
          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 







t|t-1   
Δ(SB/GDP)  
t|t-1 




Initial debt/GDP  0.0150** 0.00382 0.0279*** 0.0201*** 
 (3.72) (1.09) (6.11)  (3.93)  
Δ Output gap*D(Δ Output gap > 0) -0.190 -0.224*** -0.228 -0.295* 
 (-1.64) (-3.82) (-1.43) (-2.55) 
Δ Output gap*D(Δ Output gap < 0) -0.484* -0.107 -0.413* -0.647**  
 (-2.73) (-1.50) (-2.64) (-2.95) 
Constant -0.800** -0.322 -2.073*** -1.851*** 
  (-3.26) (-1.53) (-6.40) (-4.50) 
Observations  433 382 469  558 
R2 0.283  0.112 0.226 0.194 
Country FixedEffects yes yes yes yes 
Time FixedEffects  yes yes yes yes 
t statistics in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
Source: AMECO database (for t|2020 variables), AMECO old vintages (for t|t+1 variables from 2010 to 2019), Stability 
and Convergence Programs and Commission Staff Working Documents (for t|t+1 variables from 1999 to 2009 and  
t|t-1 variables from 1999 to 2019) 
Note: Estimations rely on the panel ordinary least squared estimator. SB = structural balance. 
This consideration validates the conclusions of Table A2 and is strengthen by the results of 
Table A3 (see Appendix), which similarly doesn’t take into account the 2011 to 2013 
consolidation years, showing that both the legislators and the Commission’s countries 
expectations were already conducive to an irresponsible fiscal policy planning during their 
booming phases. At the same time, a reduced spending capacity and an increased tax collection 
comported an even more severe procyclicality in the recession period. Similar statements can 
be asserted when looking at Table A4 (see Appendix), pointing to robust results even when 
accounting for the entire period. 
6.3 Fiscal policy reaction measured by the changes in government 
budgets and cyclically adjusted government expenditures 
The estimates of equation (4) exhibit an acyclical reaction of the fiscal policy to the economic 
cycle when considering the different government balances growth rates as fiscal impulse 
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indicators. These outcomes contradict the countercyclical results showed by Egert (2014), who 
considers the same fiscal variables in levels. A critique which could be moved to the author is 
that his econometric specification may suffer from unit root non-stationarity, leading to 
spurious regression estimations. 
Conversely, the growth of the cyclically adjusted expenditure aggregate is the only instrument 
which reacts to the cycle in a countercyclical way, when accounting for both time and country 
fixed effects. This can be explained by its significant negative association with the output gap 
variation, verified by the results, implying that a unitary percentage increase in the real 
economic output growth rate as compared to its potential is correlated to a reduction by 0.2 
percent of the change in cyclically adjusted public spending. The finding seems to validate the 
statement from Christofzik et al. (2018) regarding the revenues  higher dependency to the cycle, 
since the discretionary policy reaction shift from acyclical to countercyclical is verified when 
the revenue component of the budget is omitted for estimation purposes. 
However, as showed by Tables 5 and 6, when time fixed effects are not taken into account 
(apart from the case of the cyclically adjusted growth rate, which instead includes them), the 
fiscal policy response seems to turn to countercyclical for the majority of the settings even for 
the remaining government balances. By neglecting time fixed effects, common shocks which 
affected all the Members simultaneously over the sample period are ignored, whereas country 
fixed effects controlling for within country heterogeneity are preserved.  
An economic reasoning for the change in the elasticity coefficients significance could be that 
the estimated cyclical component, considered in the structural balance for the adjustment factor 
and not included in the measurement of the general government balances, is particularly 
affected by supranational factors, as opposed to the other budgetary balance components. 
Evidence of countercyclicality is sensibly stronger in the real-time and ex-post settings, for all 
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the government balances: during an expansionary phase, an increase in the gap between actual 
and potential output one percentage unit generates a surplus between 0.3 and 0.4 percent. 
Table 5: Fiscal policy countercyclicality using changes in general government budgets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

































debt/GDP  0.0119** 0.00700* 0.0358*** 0.0333*** 0.00276 0.00561 0.0282*** 0.0139 
 (3.05) (2.13) (5.66)  (5.53)  (0.45) (1.44) (4.17) (1.45) 
Δ Output gap  0.121 0.102 0.362*** 0.358*** 0.254*** 0.230*** 0.381*** 0.101 
 (1.83) (1.72) (7.42) (8.19) (3.82) (6.59) (9.10) (1.18) 
Constant -0.254 -0.322 -2.073*** -1.851*** 0.292 -0.175 -1.597*** -0.407 
  (-1.15) (-1.73) (-5.49) (-5.38) (0.83)   (-0.78) (-3.99)  (-0.64) 
Observations  431 388 469  558 328 339 401 252 
R2 0.066  0.046 0.191 0.216 0.051  0.170 0.435     0.057 
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time FE no no no no no no no no 
t statistics in parentheses        
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001     
Table 6: Fiscal policy countercyclicality using changes in primary balance and cyclically 
adjusted government expenditures 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 


















Initial debt/GDP  0.0124* 0.00780 0.0348*** 0.0321*** -0.0320** 
 (2.59) (1.86) (5.10) (5.16) (-2.98) 
Δ Output gap  0.210** 0.112 0.337*** 0.326*** -0.192**  
 (3.24) (1.79) (6.85) (7.31) (3.09) 
Constant -0.311 -0.399 -2.091*** -1.872*** 2.246**  
  (-1.12)   (-1.63) (-5.15) (-5.26) (3.07)    
Observations  429     374 467 558 558 
R2 0.101        0.040 0.171 0.185 0.117 
Country FixedEffects yes yes yes yes yes 
Time FixedEffects  no no no no yes 
t statistics in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
Source: AMECO database (for t|2020 variables), AMECO old vintages (for t|t+1 variables from 2010 to 2019), Stability 
and Convergence Programs and Commission Staff Working Documents (for t|t+1 variables from 1999 to 2009 and  
t|t-1 variables from 1999 to 2019) 
Note: Estimations rely on the panel ordinary least squared estimator. GGB = general government balance; Adj.GGB = general 
government balance net one-offs; PB = primary balance; Adj.Exp = cyclically adjusted government expenditures. Results of 
the regression including both country and time fixed effects for the government budgets growth rates are not reported due to 
not significant elasticity coefficients.  
Planned and forecasted net lending are not always able to detect the fiscal impulse reaction to 
the cycle, especially in the cases of total general government and primary balances which do 
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not discount for the impact of discretionary measures. Overall, it can be argued that the 
countercyclical response of the fiscal impulse, when measured using government fiscal 
indicators, is undeniable by looking at the realization of the budgetary policies, whereas its 
predictability is not homogeneous. Indeed, only the impact of the output gap variation on the 
change in adjusted balance might have been foreseen by both the Commission and policy 
makers over the analysed period, attesting the efficacy of the instrument as a valid indicator for 
virtuous fiscal policy planning. Contrarily, the response determined through primary balance 
growth rates projections captures the countercyclical effect exclusively in the case of national 
plans, and it is not identified if the change in the general government balance is adopted. 
As in the case of the change in the structural balance, the factor controlling for the fiscal policy 
debt sustainability is overall negligible, even if mainly significant. 
Tables A5 and A6 (see Appendix) corroborate these findings: the results obtained operating a 
robustness check display an even stronger countercyclical response in the case of the adjusted 
expenditure aggregate growth, even though the predicting power of the change in the adjusted 
government balance becomes weaker when looking at fiscal policy planning. 
Finally, the results of equation (6), reported in Tables 7 and 8, confirms that the change in the 
adjusted government balance is the best fiscal indicator among the government budget balances, 
since it is the only one which acts countercyclically both during upturns and downturns.  
After including control variables in the regression specification, a more pronounced 
countercyclicality is delineated by Tables A7 and A8 (see Appendix), especially during 
downturns, for all government balances. This can be partly explained as the effect of sound 
fiscal policies implemented by some countries after the crisis to reduce excessive expenditures 
through spending review programs, as suggested by the reduction of the public sector size when 




Table 7: Fiscal policy response along the cycle using changes in general government budgets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
































Initial debt/GDP  0.0120** 0.00772 0.0377*** 0.0368*** 0.00261 0.00676 0.0364*** 0.0192* 
 (3.04) (2.79) (8.34)  (10.12)  (0.43) (1.70) (7.44)  (2.57)  
Δ Output gap* 
D(Δ Output gap>0) 
0.186 0.0190 0.661 0.648 0.307* 0.225** 0.559*** 0.390** 
(1.28) (0.24) (1.31)  (1.42)  (2.11) (3.18) (6.11)  (3.10)  
Δ Output gap* 
D(Δ Output gap<0) 
0.0366 0.277*** -0.0689 0.190 0.154 0.266** 0.120 -0.0818 
(0.48) (4.05) (-0.25) (0.85) (-2.73) (3.57) (0.48) (-0.19) 
Constant -0.320 -0.278 -2.404*** -2.198*** 0.260 -0.228 -2.261*** -0.954 
  (-1.55) (-1.77) (-8.18) (-10.22) (0.75) (-1.05) (-7.26) (-1.83) 
Observations  465 402 497  558 329 339 402 252 
R2 0.075  0.055 0.083 0.115 0.052  0.162 0.150 0.088 
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time FE  no no no no no no no no 
t statistics in parentheses        
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001        
Table 8: Fiscal policy response along the cycle using changes in primary balance and 
cyclically adjusted government expenditures  
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 


















Initial debt/GDP  0.0122*    0.00963*       0.0369*** 0.0338***     -0.0279**  
 (2.47) (2.61) (8.39)  (9.26)   (-3.35)  
Δ Output gap*D(Δ Output gap> 0) 0.329* 0.0831 0.803 0.754 -0.105 
 (2.16) (0.72) (1.55)  (1.57)   (-2.23)  
Δ Output gap*D(Δ Output gap< 0) 0.0598 0.229* -0.204 0.0774 0.416 
 (0.60) (2.46) (-0.78) (0.35) (1.78) 
Constant -0.398 -0.449*      -2.535***      -2.166***    2.071** 
  (-1.45) (-2.08) (-8.54) (-10.02) (2.99) 
Observations  451 387 495  558  558 
R2 0.113  0.052 0.089 0.109 0.102 
Country FixedEffects yes yes yes yes yes 
Time FixedEffects  no no no no yes 
t statistics in parentheses      
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001      
Source: AMECO database (for t|2020 variables), AMECO old vintages (for t|t+1 variables from 2010 to 2019), Stability 
and Convergence Programs and Commission Staff Working Documents (for t|t+1 variables from 1999 to 2009 and  
t|t-1 variables from 1999 to 2019) 
Note: Estimations rely on the panel ordinary least squared estimator. GGB = general government balance; Adj.GGB = general 
government balance net one-offs; PB = primary balance; Adj.Exp = cyclically adjusted government expenditures. Results of 
the regression including both country and time fixed effects for the government budgets growth rates are not reported due to 
not significant elasticity coefficients. 
7. Conclusion 
The paper confirms that the drawbacks of the current EU fiscal framework led to two major 
outcomes in the last 20 years: fiscal rules compliance deficiency and failure in achievement of 
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discretionary policy countercyclicality. In the Euro Area, from 2011 to 2018, the current fiscal 
framework observed a non-compliance rate above two-thirds (98 out of 144 observations). 
Moreover, using data for the EU from 1999 to 2019, we show a clear procyclical behaviour of 
the current key fiscal impulse indicator, the change in structural balance, in particular when 
relying on ex-post data (i.e. the actual fiscal stance vis-à-vis the planned fiscal stance).  
Our analysis presents a feasible solution to overcome these problems by providing evidence of 
the beneficial effects of using the expenditure rule proposed by Ducoudré et al.(2018). In fact, 
the employment of an alternative fiscal indicator - the cyclically adjusted expenditures growth 
rate - ensures a countercyclical response is empirically activated. However, when the fiscal 
policy reaction is measured by the changes in government balances (unadjusted and adjusted 
general government balances, primary balance), this result only holds if one does not control 
for symmetric shocks. Accounting for them renders these indicators irresponsive to the cycle, 
which means that symmetric shocks (like COVID-19) need a supranational mechanism able at 
least to coordinate the response and ensure effective countercyclical action. 
Our final result is that the new expenditure rule would have been binding in 72 percent of the 
analysed years (61 in the Euro Area), especially during the expansion periods before and after 
the crisis. This implies a different behaviour of the fiscal stance would have been triggered with 
the proposed rule in place, changing the course of EU fiscal history. However, the argument 
can be valid only if the new rule’s compliance levels would have been higher than the MTO 
ones. While that is an important avenue of future research, the fact that the proposal is both 
simpler and more transparent suggests that the new expenditure rule would have been easier to 
enforce. Another possible investigation is the study of debt sustainability patterns arising from 
the new rule. A fully-fledged model would allow a debt path simulation, which is an important 
element to thoroughly assess the merits of the new proposal. Finally, there are political economy 
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Table A1: Fiscal policy procyclicality in the current framework including controls 
          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




 Ex Post 
  
Δ(SB/GDP)  
t|t-1   
Δ(SB/GDP) 
t|t-1 Δ(SB/GDP) t|t+1 
Δ(SB/GDP) 
t|2020 
Initial debt/GDP  0.000894 -0.00166 0.0179* 0.0204*** 
 (0.14) (-0.21) (2.48) (3.90)    
Δ Output gap  -0.313** -0.194** -0.288* -0.385*** 
 (-3.49) (-2.96) (-2.24) (-5.83) 
Population growth -0.352 -0.113 -0.151 -0.0251 
 (-2.74) (-1.27) (-0.92) (-0.18) 
Debt servicing 0.207 0.114 -0.000363 0.0117 
 (1.59) (1.02) (-0.00) (0.13) 
Openness -0.00764 -0.00727** 0.00344 0.00531 
 (-1.93) (-2.88) (0.46) (1.37) 
Inflation growth 0.000769 0.0108 -0.0528 -0.0212 
 (0.09) (1.24) (-1.85) (-1.39) 
Real GDP growth 0.0219 -0.0240 0.0439 -0.00849 
 (0.86) (-1.68) (0.94) (-0.24) 
Public sector size 0.00509 -0.108* -0.160* -0.123 
 (0.11) (-2.60) (-2.11) (-1.98) 
Public investment 0.00227 -0.0556 -0.183 -0.237* 
 (0.04) (-1.06) (-1.65) (-2.36) 
Real house price growth -0.00859 0.00343 -0.00969 0.00597 
 (-1.81) (0.59) (-0.73) (0.49) 
Constant 0.884 3.304* 1.863 1.004 
  (0.71) (2.75) (0.88) (0.59) 
Observations  394 352 418 460 
R2 0.343 0.196 0.292 0.403 
Country FixedEffects yes yes yes yes 
Time FixedEffects  yes yes yes yes 
t statistics in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
Source: AMECO database (for t|2020 variables), AMECO old vintages (for t|t+1 variables from 2010 to 2019), 
Stability and Convergence Programs and Commission Staff Working Documents (for t|t+1 variables from 1999 to 
2009 and t|t-1 variables from 1999 to 2019), Eurostat (for Openness, Real GDP growth and Public investment) 











Table A2: Fiscal policy procyclicality in the current framework excluding periods of 
fiscal consolidation during the crisis 
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Plans EC Forecast Actual, Real Time Actual, Ex Post 
  Δ(SB/GDP) t|t-1   Δ(SB/GDP) t|t-1 Δ(SB/GDP) t|t+1 Δ(SB/GDP) t|2020 
Initial debt/GDP  0.0169** 0.00531 0.0241*** 0.0228*** 
 (3.19) (1.08) (4.06) (4.71) 
Δ Output gap  -0.435*** -0.295*** -0.324** -0.369*** 
 (-4.64) (-4.07) (-3.64) (-5.49) 
Constant -0.859* -0.390 -1.863*** -1.709*** 
  (-2.55) (-1.23) (-4.52) (-5.34) 
Observations  354 305 390 474 
R2 0.280 0.130 0.255 0.236 
Country FixedEffects yes yes yes yes 
Time FixedEffects  yes yes yes yes 
t statistics in parentheses    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Source: AMECO database (for t|2020 variables), AMECO old vintages (for t|t+1 variables from 2010 to 2019), 
Stability and Convergence Programs and Commission Staff Working Documents (for t|t+1 variables from 1999 to 
2009 and t|t-1 variables from 1999 to 2019) 
Note: Observations from 2011 to 2013 are excluded. Estimations rely on the panel ordinary least squared estimator. 
SB = structural balance.  
Table A3: Asymmetric policy response and deficit bias in the current framework 
excluding periods of fiscal consolidation during the crisis 
          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





  Δ(SB/GDP) t|t-1   Δ(SB/GDP) t|t-1 Δ(SB/GDP) t|t+1 Δ(SB/GDP) t|2020 
Initial debt/GDP  0.0165** 0.00249 0.0240*** 0.0159*** 
 (2.89) (0.59) (4.40)  (2.78)  
Δ Output gap*D(Δ Output gap> 0) -0.367** -0.272*** -0.276 -0.151 
 (-3.26) (-3.10) (-1.21) (-0.80) 
Δ Output gap*D(Δ Output gap<0) -0.478** -0.102 -0.449** -0.647**  
 (-3.18) (-1.46) (-3.02) (-2.90) 
Constant -0.855* -0.237 -1.900*** -1.318*** 
  (-2.45) (-0.89) (-4.96) (-3.82) 
Observations  354 306 395 474 
R2 0.282  0.079 0.205 0.128 
Country FixedEffects yes yes yes yes 
Time FixedEffects  yes yes yes yes 
t statistics in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
Source: AMECO database (for t|2020 variables), AMECO old vintages (for t|t+1 variables from 2010 to 2019), Stability 
and Convergence Programs and Commission Staff Working Documents (for t|t+1 variables from 1999 to 2009 and 
t|t-1 variables from 1999 to 2019) 
Note: Observations from 2011 to 2013 are excluded. Estimations rely on the panel ordinary least squared estimator.  
SB = structural balance. 
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Table A4: Asymmetric policy response and deficit bias in the current framework 
including controls 
          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Plans EC Forecast Actual, Real Time Actual, Ex Post 
  Δ(SB/GDP) t|t-1   Δ(SB/GDP) t|t-1 Δ(SB/GDP) t|t+1 Δ(SB/GDP) t|2020 
Initial debt/GDP  -0.000113 -0.00153 0.0188*       0.0210*** 
 (-0.02) (-0.20) (2.45) (4.14) 
Δ Output gap*D(Δ Output gap > 0) -0.225 -0.202** -0.351*      -0.422*** 
 (-1.73) (-3.20) (-2.34) (-4.77) 
Δ Output gap*D(Δ Output gap < 0) -0.441** -0.179 -0.246      -0.362*** 
 (-3.04) (-1.68) (-1.83) (-4.08) 
Population growth -0.317** -0.117 -0.189 -0.0352 
 (-2.92) (-1.21) (-1.02) (-0.23) 
Debt servicing 0.231 0.112 -0.00920 0.00744 
 (1.73) (1.01) (-0.06) (0.09) 
Openness -0.00707 -0.00742** 0.00300 0.00530 
 (-1.89) (-2.95) (0.39) (1.33) 
Inflation growth -0.000720 0.0108 -0.0476 -0.0202 
 (-0.08) (1.23) (-1.50) (-1.37) 
Real GDP growth 0.0241 -0.0240 0.0403 -0.00916 
 (0.94) (-1.69) (0.88) (-0.26) 
Public sector size 0.00976 -0.108* -0.177* -0.126 
 (0.21) (-2.57) (-2.26) (-2.00) 
Public investment -0.00527 -0.0546 -0.184 -0.234* 
 (-0.08) (-1.03) (-1.72) (-2.30) 
Real house price growth -0.00702 0.00326 -0.0110 0.00543 
 (-1.45) (0.52) (-0.81) (0.45) 
Constant 0.711 3.338* 2.242 1.030 
  (0.59) (2.72) (1.02) (0.60) 
Observations  394 353 420 460 
R2 0.349 0.196 0.306 0.403 
Country FixedEffects yes yes yes yes 
Time FixedEffects  yes yes yes yes 
t statistics in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
Source: AMECO database (for t|2020 variables), AMECO old vintages (for t|t+1 variables from 2010 to 2019), Stability 
and Convergence Programs and Commission Staff Working Documents (for t|t+1 variables from 1999 to 2009 and 
t|t-1 variables from 1999 to 2019), Eurostat (for Openness, Real GDP growth and Public investment) 














Table A5: Fiscal policy countercyclicality using changes in general government 
budgets and including controls 
                  
                 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
































Initial debt/GDP  0.0111* 0.0123** 0.0289** 0.0280* 0.00999* 0.00904 0.0234* 0.0217 
 (2.17) (3.29) (2.85) (2.54) (2.11) (1.74) (2.24) (1.96) 
Δ Output gap  0.111 0.134      0.340***    0.444*** 0.183* 0.138    0.351***    0.487*** 
 (1.53) (1.98) (5.48) (6.51) (2.44) (1.91) (5.01) (7.28) 
Population growth -0.0546 0.156 0.235 0.345 -0.150 0.140 0.136 0.286 
 (-0.41) (1.55) (1.07) (1.88) (-1.13) (1.22) (0.66) (1.49) 
Debt servicing 0.221 0.0775 0.124 0.222 0.296 0.326* 0.256 0.315 
 (1.72) (0.72) (0.82) (1.58) (1.98) (2.08) (1.35) (1.99) 
Openness -0.00247 -0.00669** -0.0102 -0.00433 -0.00106 -0.00461 -0.00985 -0.00243 
 (-0.75) (-3.47) (-0.95) (-0.69) (-0.34) (-1.78) (-0.92) (-0.35) 
Inflation growth 0.0169 0.0223** 0.0205 0.0453 0.0250* 0.0250* 0.0155 0.0453 
 (1.76) (3.11) (0.37) (1.02) (2.63) (2.25) (0.32) (1.02) 
Real GDP growth 0.0142 -0.0299* 0.101 -0.0664 0.0150 -0.0230 0.0897 -0.113* 
 (0.94) (-2.63) (1.23) (-1.41) (0.86) (-1.94) (1.06) (-2.39) 
Public sector size 0.0364 -0.0631 -0.0589 -0.160 0.137* -0.00571 -0.0344 -0.120 
 (0.58) (-1.44) (-0.43) (-1.94) (2.43) (-0.10) (-0.29) (-1.45) 
Public investment 0.0444 0.00453 -0.456 -0.454* 0.0435 0.0288 -0.423 -0.446* 
 (0.54) (0.08) (-1.92) (-2.56) (0.50) (0.43) (-1.70) (-2.43) 
Real house price 
growth 
-0.0107 0.00488 -0.0422* -0.0164 -0.00622 0.00540 -0.0489** -0.0200 
(-1.56) (0.83) (-2.75) (-1.03) (-0.63) (0.71) (-3.23) (-1.11) 
Constant -1.274 1.210 1.899 3.235 -3.572* -0.636 1.312 2.383 
  (-0.95) (1.32) (0.60) (1.75) (-2.51) (-0.54) (0.46) (1.28) 
Observations  392 358 422 460 392 343 420 460 
R2 0.112 0.084 0.220 0.264 0.190 0.085 0.200 0.232 
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time FE  no no no no no no no no 
t statistics in parentheses        
  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Source: AMECO database (for t|2020 variables), AMECO old vintages (for t|t+1 variables from 2010 to 2019), Stability 
and Convergence Programs and Commission Staff Working Documents (for t|t+1 variables from 1999 to 2009 and  
t|t-1 variables from 1999 to 2019), Eurostat (for Openness, Real GDP growth and Public investment) 
Note: Estimations rely on the panel ordinary least squared estimator. GGB = general government balance; Adj.GGB = general 
government balance net one-offs. Results of the regression including both country and time fixed effects for the government 








Table A6: Fiscal policy countercyclicality using changes in primary balance and 
cyclically adjusted government expenditures, including controls 
            
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 


















Initial debt/GDP  -0.00730 0.00730 0.0134 -0.00654 -0.0189 
 (-1.36) (1.73) (1.85) (-0.67) (-1.30) 
Δ Output gap  0.174 0.261*** 0.318*** 0.162 0.302 
 (2.02) (5.62) (7.69) (2.05) (2.56) 
Population growth -0.0710 -0.00744 -0.138 -0.642*** -0.453* 
 (-0.38) (-0.08) (-0.78) (-3.88) (-2.49) 
Debt servicing 0.481* 0.146 0.268 0.403** -0.333* 
 (2.48) (1.76) (1.47) (2.99) (-2.23) 
Openness 0.00742 -0.00554* 0.00269 -0.0189** 0.00376 
 (1.16) (-2.25) (0.41) (-3.48) (0.78) 
Inflation growth 0.0468 0.0253* 0.0210 -0.00582 -0.0190 
 (1.75) (2.31) (0.67) (-0.15) (-0.42) 
Real GDP growth 0.00135 -0.0398*** 0.104** 0.000594 -0.183** 
 (0.06) (-3.74) (2.87) (0.01) (-3.08) 
Public sector size 0.0470 -0.129*** -0.184 -0.350** 0.0757 
 (0.73) (-3.92) (-1.80) (-3.16) (1.15) 
Public investment -0.0917 0.0336 -0.261 -0.0835 0.504** 
 (-1.42) (0.71) (-2.05) (-0.67) (3.21) 
Real house price  
growth 
-0.0105 -0.000934 -0.0343** -0.0313* 0.0434** 
(-1.17) (-0.17) (-3.42) (-2.11) (2.89) 
Constant -1.675 2.591** 2.909 10.03*** -1.290 
  (-0.84) (3.32) (1.30) (4.04) (-0.65) 
Observations  298 311 361 222 460 
R2 0.147 0.253 0.512 0.220 0.168 
Country FixedEffects yes yes yes yes yes 
Time FixedEffects  no no no no yes 
t statistics in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
Source: AMECO database (for t|2020 variables), AMECO old vintages (for t|t+1 variables from 2010 to 2019), Stability 
and Convergence Programs and Commission Staff Working Documents (for t|t+1 variables from 1999 to 2009 and 
 t|t-1 variables from 1999 to 2019), Eurostat (for Openness, Real GDP growth and Public investment) 
Note: Estimations rely on the panel ordinary least squared estimator. PB = primary balance; Adj.Exp = cyclically adjusted 
government expenditures. Results of the regression including both country and time fixed effects for the government budgets 







Table A7: Fiscal policy response along the cycle using changes in general government budgets 
and including controls 
         
                  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
































Initial debt/GDP  0.0118* 0.0138*** 0.0295** 0.0288* -0.00699 0.00719 0.0147* -0.00184 
 (2.28) (3.91) (3.00) (2.55) (-1.31) (1.72) (2.41) (-0.16) 
Δ Output gap*D 
(Δ Output gap > 0) 
0.115 0.0185 0.231 0.275 0.178 0.272** 0.0329 0.234 
(0.82) (0.18) (1.94) (1.57) (1.34) (3.57) (0.36) (1.71) 
Δ Output gap*D 
(Δ Output gap < 0) 
0.0993 0.288** 0.381*** 0.519*** 0.169 0.247** 0.435*** 0.0235 
(1.19) (3.01) (4.84) (7.60) (1.24) (2.93) (6.02) (0.13) 
Population growth -0.0639 0.116 0.137 0.275 -0.0727 -0.00324 -0.405* -0.624** 
 (-0.50) (1.06) (0.47) (1.62) (-0.39) (-0.03) (-2.25) (-3.47) 
Debt servicing 0.179 0.0846 0.0566 0.215 0.472* 0.146 0.0839 0.279 
 (1.65) (0.78) (0.38) (1.54) (2.46) (1.76) (0.44) (1.43) 
Openness -0.00155 -0.00887*** -0.0104 -0.00489 0.00727 -0.00548* -0.00390 -0.0190** 
 (-0.52) (-4.90) (-0.99) (-0.75) (1.14) (-2.30) (-0.59) (-3.52) 
Inflation growth 0.0160 0.0229** 0.0243 0.0470 0.0467 0.0252* 0.0343 -0.0118 
 (1.80) (3.28) (0.49) (1.07) (1.74) (2.30) (1.23) (-0.30) 
Real GDP growth 0.0143 -0.0237* 0.0965 -0.0701 0.00152 -0.0402*** 0.102* -0.00217 
 (0.92) (-2.15) (1.30) (-1.48) (0.07) (-4.09) (2.17) (-0.04) 
Public sector size 0.0581 -0.0574 -0.108 -0.160 0.0484 -0.129*** -0.304** -0.342** 
 (0.97) (-1.33) (-1.06) (-2.00) (0.75) (-3.92) (-2.87) (-2.97) 
Public investment 0.0346 0.00197 -0.466 -0.420* -0.0907 0.0324 -0.222 -0.0733 
 (0.43) (0.04) (-1.85) (-2.42) (-1.39) (0.69) (-1.70) (-0.61) 
Real house price 
growth 
-0.0101 0.00251 -0.0448** -0.0175 "-0.0105" -0.000553 -0.0437*** -0.0337* 
(-1.49) (0.45) (-3.01) (-1.08) (-1.20) (-0.09) (-3.77) (-2.11) 
Constant -1.765 1.382 3.190 3.371 -1.696 2.584** 6.691** 9.696*** 
  (-1.40) (1.56) (1.25) (1.79) (-0.85) (3.28) (2.78) (3.80) 
Observations  416 368 435 460 299 311 362 222 
R2 0.113 0.101 0.223 0.269 0.146 0.253 0.531 0.228 
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time FE  no no no no no no no no 
t statistics in parentheses        
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001         
Source: AMECO database (for t|2020 variables), AMECO old vintages (for t|t+1 variables from 2010 to 2019), Stability 
and Convergence Programs and Commission Staff Working Documents (for t|t+1 variables from 1999 to 2009 and  
t|t-1 variables from 1999 to 2019), Eurostat (for Openness, Real GDP growth and Public investment) 
Note: Estimations rely on the panel ordinary least squared estimator. GGB = general government balance; Adj.GGB = general 
government balance net one-offs. Results of the regression including both country and time fixed effects for the government 






Table A8: Fiscal policy response along the cycle using changes in primary balance and 
cyclically adjusted government expenditures, including controls 
            
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 


















Initial debt/GDP  0.0108* 0.0154** 0.0245* 0.0225 -0.0198 
 (2.30) (2.82) (2.38) (1.98) (-1.16) 
Δ Output gap* 
D(Δ Output gap > 0) 
0215 0.00174 0.243 0.325 0.350 
(1.43) (0.01) (2.00) (1.80) (1.31) 
Δ Output gap* 
D(Δ Output gap <0) 
0.143 0.318**      0.391***      0.558***  -0.271* 
(1.46) (2.93) (4.72) (7.72) (2.64) 
Population growth -0.145 0.0652 0.0396 0.220 -0.440* 
 (-1.08) (0.51) (0.15) (1.18) (-2.53) 
Debt servicing 0.253 0.237 0.170 0.308 -0.327 
 (1.94) (1.50) (0.96) (1.96) (-2.02) 
Openness -0.000721 -0.00961* -0.0106 -0.00297 0.00377 
 (-0.26) (-2.65) (-1.01) (-0.42) (0.78) 
Inflation growth 0.0243* 0.0249* 0.0197 0.0469 -0.0205 
 (2.64) (2.25) (0.43) (1.07) (-0.42) 
Real GDP growth 0.0132 -0.0197 0.0886 -0.117* -0.182** 
 (0.74) (-1.57) (1.06) (-2.45) (-3.18) 
Public sector size 0.153* -0.0119 -0.0657 -0.120 0.0799 
 (2.76) (-0.21) (-0.59) (-1.49) (1.14) 
Public investment 0.0301 0 0 0 0.500** 
 (0.35) (.) (.) (.) (3.18) 
Real house price growth -0.00542 0.00200 -0.0524** -0.0211 0.0441* 
 (-0.56) (0.30) (-3.44) (-1.16) (2.66) 
Constant -3.875** 0.0398 2.348 2.513 -1.325 
  (-2.81) (0.03) (0.96) (1.32) (-0.67) 
Observations  409 352 429 460 460 
R2 0.194 0.104 0.204 0.237 0.168 
Country FixedEffects yes yes yes yes yes 
Time FixedEffects  no no no no yes 
t statistics in parentheses     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
Source: AMECO database (for t|2020 variables), AMECO old vintages (for t|t+1 variables from 2010 to 2019), Stability 
and Convergence Programs and Commission Staff Working Documents (for t|t+1 variables from 1999 to 2009 and 
 t|t-1 variables from 1999 to 2019), Eurostat (for Openness, Real GDP growth and Public investment) 
Note: Estimations rely on the panel ordinary least squared estimator. PB = primary balance; Adj.Exp = cyclically adjusted 
government expenditures. Results of the regression including both country and time fixed effects for the government budgets 
growth rates are not reported due to not significant elasticity coefficients. 
 
 
